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CMS_VERIFY(3SSL)                    OpenSSL                    CMS_VERIFY(3SSL)

NAME
       CMS_verify, CMS_SignedData_verify, CMS_get0_signers - verify a CMS
       SignedData structure

SYNOPSIS
        #include <openssl/cms.h>

        int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
                       BIO *detached_data, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
        BIO *CMS_SignedData_verify(CMS_SignedData *sd, BIO *detached_data,
                                   STACK_OF(X509) *scerts, X509_STORE *store,
                                   STACK_OF(X509) *extra, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls,
                                   unsigned int flags,
                                   OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq);

        STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get0_signers(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);

DESCRIPTION
       CMS_verify() is very similar to PKCS7_verify(3). It verifies a CMS
       SignedData structure contained in a structure of type CMS_ContentInfo.
       cms points to the CMS_ContentInfo structure to verify.  The optional
       certs parameter refers to a set of certificates in which to search for
       signing certificates.  It is also used as a source of untrusted
       intermediate CA certificates for chain building.  cms may contain extra
       untrusted CA certificates that may be used for chain building as well as
       CRLs that may be used for certificate validation.  store may be NULL or
       point to the trusted certificate store to use for chain verification.
       detached_data refers to the signed data if the content is detached from
       cms.  Otherwise detached_data should be NULL and the signed data must be
       in cms.  The content is written to the BIO out unless it is NULL.  flags
       is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the operation.

       CMS_SignedData_verify() is like CMS_verify() except that it operates on
       CMS SignedData input in the sd argument, it has some additional
       parameters described next, and on success it returns the verified
       content as a memory BIO.  The optional extra parameter may be used to
       provide untrusted CA certificates that may be helpful for chain building
       in certificate validation.  This list of certificates must not contain
       duplicates.  The optional crls parameter may be used to provide extra
       CRLs.  Also the list of CRLs must not contain duplicates.  The optional
       parameters library context libctx and property query propq are used when
       retrieving algorithms from providers.

       CMS_get0_signers() retrieves the signing certificate(s) from cms; it may
       only be called after a successful CMS_verify() or
       CMS_SignedData_verify() operation.

VERIFY PROCESS
       Normally the verify process proceeds as follows.

       Initially some sanity checks are performed on cms. The type of cms must
       be SignedData. There must be at least one signature on the data and if
       the content is detached detached_data cannot be NULL.

       An attempt is made to locate all the signing certificate(s), first
       looking in the certs parameter (if it is not NULL) and then looking in
       any certificates contained in the cms structure unless CMS_NOINTERN is
       set.  If any signing certificate cannot be located the operation fails.

       Each signing certificate is chain verified using the smimesign purpose
       and using the trusted certificate store store if supplied.  Any internal
       certificates in the message, which may have been added using
       CMS_add1_cert(3), are used as untrusted CAs.  If CRL checking is enabled
       in store and CMS_NOCRL is not set, any internal CRLs, which may have
       been added using CMS_add1_crl(3), are used in addition to attempting to
       look them up in store.  If store is not NULL and any chain verify fails
       an error code is returned.

       Finally the signed content is read (and written to out unless it is
       NULL) and the signature is checked.

       If all signatures verify correctly then the function is successful.

       Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the flags
       parameter to change the default verify behaviour.

       If CMS_NOINTERN is set the certificates in the message itself are not
       searched when locating the signing certificate(s).  This means that all
       the signing certificates must be in the certs parameter.

       If CMS_NOCRL is set and CRL checking is enabled in store then any CRLs
       in the message itself and provided via the crls parameter are ignored.

       If the CMS_TEXT flag is set MIME headers for type "text/plain" are
       deleted from the content. If the content is not of type "text/plain"
       then an error is returned.

       If CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY is set the signing certificates are not
       chain verified, unless CMS_CADES flag is also set.

       If CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY is set the signed attributes signature is not
       verified, unless CMS_CADES flag is also set.

       If CMS_CADES is set, each signer certificate is checked against the ESS
       signingCertificate or ESS signingCertificateV2 extension that is
       required in the signed attributes of the signature.

       If CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY is set then the content digest is not checked.

NOTES
       One application of CMS_NOINTERN is to only accept messages signed by a
       small number of certificates. The acceptable certificates would be
       passed in the certs parameter. In this case if the signer certificate is
       not one of the certificates supplied in certs then the verify will fail
       because the signer cannot be found.

       In some cases the standard techniques for looking up and validating
       certificates are not appropriate: for example an application may wish to
       lookup certificates in a database or perform customised verification.
       This can be achieved by setting and verifying the signer certificates
       manually using the signed data utility functions.

       Care should be taken when modifying the default verify behaviour, for
       example setting CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY will totally disable all content
       verification and any modified content will be considered valid. This
       combination is however useful if one merely wishes to write the content
       to out and its validity is not considered important.

       Chain verification should arguably be performed using the signing time
       rather than the current time. However, since the signing time is
       supplied by the signer it cannot be trusted without additional evidence
       (such as a trusted timestamp).

RETURN VALUES
       CMS_verify() returns 1 for a successful verification and 0 if an error
       occurred.

       CMS_SignedData_verify() returns a memory BIO containing the verified
       content, or NULL on error.

       CMS_get0_signers() returns all signers or NULL if an error occurred.

       The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).

BUGS
       The trusted certificate store is not searched for the signing
       certificate.  This is primarily due to the inadequacies of the current
       X509_STORE functionality.

       The lack of single pass processing means that the signed content must
       all be held in memory if it is not detached.

SEE ALSO
       PKCS7_verify(3), CMS_add1_cert(3), CMS_add1_crl(3),
       OSSL_ESS_check_signing_certs(3), ERR_get_error(3), CMS_sign(3)

HISTORY
       CMS_SignedData_verify() was added in OpenSSL 3.2.

COPYRIGHT
       Copyright 2008-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

       Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
       this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
       in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
       <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.

3.5.7                              2026-06-09                  CMS_VERIFY(3SSL)

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