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SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY(3SSL)            OpenSSL            SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY(3SSL)

NAME
       SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx, SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify,
       SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth, SSL_set_verify_depth, SSL_verify_cb,
       SSL_verify_client_post_handshake, SSL_set_post_handshake_auth,
       SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth - set various SSL/TLS parameters for
       peer certificate verification

SYNOPSIS
        #include <openssl/ssl.h>

        typedef int (*SSL_verify_cb)(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);

        void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback);
        void SSL_set_verify(SSL *ssl, int mode, SSL_verify_cb verify_callback);
        SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void);

        void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth);
        void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *ssl, int depth);

        int SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(SSL *ssl);
        void SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int val);
        void SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL *ssl, int val);

DESCRIPTION
       SSL_CTX_set_verify() sets the verification flags for ctx to be mode and
       specifies the verify_callback function to be used. If no callback
       function shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for
       verify_callback. ctx MUST NOT be NULL.

       SSL_set_verify() sets the verification flags for ssl to be mode and
       specifies the verify_callback function to be used. If no callback
       function shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for
       verify_callback. In this case last verify_callback set specifically for
       this ssl remains. If no special callback was set before, the default
       callback for the underlying ctx is used, that was valid at the time ssl
       was created with SSL_new(3). Within the callback function,
       SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx can be called to get the data index
       of the current SSL object that is doing the verification.

       In client mode verify_callback may also call the SSL_set_retry_verify(3)
       function on the SSL object set in the x509_store_ctx ex data (see
       SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)) and return 1.  This would be
       typically done in case the certificate verification was not yet able to
       succeed.  This makes the handshake suspend and return control to the
       calling application with SSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY.  The application
       can for instance fetch further certificates or cert status information
       needed for the verification.  Calling SSL_connect(3) again resumes the
       connection attempt by retrying the server certificate verification step.
       This process may even be repeated if need be.  Note that the handshake
       may still be aborted if a subsequent invocation of the callback (e.g.,
       at a lower depth, or for a separate error condition) returns 0.

       SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum depth for the certificate
       chain verification that shall be allowed for ctx.

       SSL_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum depth for the certificate chain
       verification that shall be allowed for ssl.

       SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth() and SSL_set_post_handshake_auth()
       enable the Post-Handshake Authentication extension to be added to the
       ClientHello such that post-handshake authentication can be requested by
       the server. If val is 0 then the extension is not sent, otherwise it is.
       By default the extension is not sent. A certificate callback will need
       to be set via SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb() if no certificate is provided
       at initialization.

       SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() causes a CertificateRequest message
       to be sent by a server on the given ssl connection. The SSL_VERIFY_PEER
       flag must be set; the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE flag is optional.

NOTES
       The verification of certificates can be controlled by a set of logically
       or'ed mode flags:

       SSL_VERIFY_NONE
           Server  mode:  the server will not send a client certificate request
           to the client, so the client will not send a certificate.

           Client mode: if not using an anonymous cipher (by default disabled),
           the server will send a certificate which will be checked. The result
           of the certificate verification process can  be  checked  after  the
           TLS/SSL  handshake using the SSL_get_verify_result(3) function.  The
           handshake will be continued regardless of the verification result.

       SSL_VERIFY_PEER
           Server mode: the server sends a client certificate  request  to  the
           client.   The  certificate  returned  (if  any)  is  checked. If the
           verification process fails, the  TLS/SSL  handshake  is  immediately
           terminated  with  an  alert  message  containing  the reason for the
           verification failure.   The  behaviour  can  be  controlled  by  the
           additional  SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,  SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
           and SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE flags.

           Client mode: the server certificate is verified. If the verification
           process fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is immediately terminated  with
           an alert message containing the reason for the verification failure.
           If  no  server  certificate  is sent, because an anonymous cipher is
           used, SSL_VERIFY_PEER is ignored.

       SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
           Server mode: if the client did not return a certificate, the TLS/SSL
           handshake is  immediately  terminated  with  a  "handshake  failure"
           alert.  This flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER.

           Client mode: ignored (see BUGS)

       SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
           Server  mode:  only  request  a  client  certificate once during the
           connection. Do  not  ask  for  a  client  certificate  again  during
           renegotiation  or post-authentication if a certificate was requested
           during the initial handshake. This flag must be used  together  with
           SSL_VERIFY_PEER.

           Client mode: ignored (see BUGS)

       SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE
           Server  mode:  the server will not send a client certificate request
           during  the  initial  handshake,  but  will  send  the  request  via
           SSL_verify_client_post_handshake().  This  allows the SSL_CTX or SSL
           to be configured for post-handshake  peer  verification  before  the
           handshake   occurs.   This   flag   must   be   used  together  with
           SSL_VERIFY_PEER. TLSv1.3 only; no effect on pre-TLSv1.3 connections.

           Client mode: ignored (see BUGS)

       If the mode is SSL_VERIFY_NONE none of the other flags may be set.

       If   verification    flags    are    not    modified    explicitly    by
       SSL_CTX_set_verify()  or  SSL_set_verify(),  the  default  value will be
       SSL_VERIFY_NONE.

       The actual verification procedure is performed either using the built-in
       verification   procedure   or   using   another   application   provided
       verification function set with SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3).  The
       following  descriptions  apply in the case of the built-in procedure. An
       application provided procedure also  has  access  to  the  verify  depth
       information  and  the  verify_callback()  function,  but  the  way  this
       information is used may be different.

       SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() and SSL_set_verify_depth() set a limit on the
       number  of  certificates  between  the   end-entity   and   trust-anchor
       certificates.   Neither the end-entity nor the trust-anchor certificates
       count against depth. If the certificate chain needed to reach a  trusted
       issuer  is  longer  than depth+2, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG will be
       issued.  The depth count is "level 0:peer  certificate",  "level  1:  CA
       certificate", "level 2: higher level CA certificate", and so on. Setting
       the maximum depth to 2 allows the levels 0, 1, 2 and 3 (0 being the end-
       entity  and  3  the  trust-anchor).   The  default  depth  limit is 100,
       allowing  for  the  peer  certificate,  at  most  100  intermediate   CA
       certificates and a final trust anchor certificate.

       The  verify_callback  function is used to control the behaviour when the
       SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag is set. It must be supplied by the application  and
       receives two arguments: preverify_ok indicates, whether the verification
       of  the  certificate  in  question  was  passed  (preverify_ok=1) or not
       (preverify_ok=0). x509_ctx is a pointer to the complete context used for
       the certificate chain verification.

       The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest nesting level
       (the root CA certificate) and worked upward to the  peer's  certificate.
       At  each  level signatures and issuer attributes are checked. Whenever a
       verification error is found, the error number is stored in x509_ctx  and
       verify_callback    is    called   with   preverify_ok=0.   By   applying
       X509_CTX_store_* functions verify_callback can locate the certificate in
       question and perform additional steps (see EXAMPLES).  If  no  error  is
       found  for  a certificate, verify_callback is called with preverify_ok=1
       before advancing to the next level.

       The return value of verify_callback controls the strategy of the further
       verification process. If verify_callback  returns  0,  the  verification
       process  is  immediately  stopped  with  "verification failed" state. If
       SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set, a verification failure alert is sent to the peer
       and the TLS/SSL handshake is terminated. If verify_callback  returns  1,
       the verification process is continued. If verify_callback always returns
       1,  the  TLS/SSL  handshake  will  not  be  terminated  with  respect to
       verification failures  and  the  connection  will  be  established.  The
       calling  process  can  however  retrieve  the  error  code  of  the last
       verification error using SSL_get_verify_result(3) or by maintaining  its
       own error storage managed by verify_callback.

       If  no  verify_callback is specified, the default callback will be used.
       Its return value is identical to preverify_ok, so that any  verification
       failure  will  lead  to  a  termination of the TLS/SSL handshake with an
       alert message, if SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set.

       After calling SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(), the client will need to add
       a certificate or certificate callback to its configuration before it can
       successfully authenticate. This must be called before SSL_connect().

       SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() requires that verify flags have  been
       previously set, and that a client sent the post-handshake authentication
       extension.  When  the  client  returns a certificate the verify callback
       will be invoked. A write operation must take place for  the  Certificate
       Request   to   be   sent   to   the   client,  this  can  be  done  with
       SSL_do_handshake() or SSL_write_ex().  Only one certificate request  may
       be outstanding at any time.

       When  post-handshake authentication occurs, a refreshed NewSessionTicket
       message is sent to the client.

       Post-handshake   authentication    cannot    be    used    with    QUIC.
       SSL_set_post_handshake_auth()  has  no  effect  if  called on a QUIC SSL
       object.

BUGS
       In client mode, it is not checked whether the  SSL_VERIFY_PEER  flag  is
       set,  but whether any flags other than SSL_VERIFY_NONE are set. This can
       lead to unexpected behaviour if SSL_VERIFY_PEER and other flags are  not
       used as required.

RETURN VALUES
       The SSL*_set_verify*() functions do not provide diagnostic information.

       The SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() function returns 1 if the request
       succeeded,  and 0 if the request failed. The error stack can be examined
       to determine the failure reason.

EXAMPLES
       The following code sequence realizes an example verify_callback function
       that  will  always  continue  the  TLS/SSL   handshake   regardless   of
       verification  failure,  if  wished. The callback realizes a verification
       depth limit with more informational output.

       All verification errors are printed; information about  the  certificate
       chain  is printed on request.  The example is realized for a server that
       does allow but not require client certificates.

       The example makes use of the ex_data technique to store application data
       into/retrieve   application   data   from   the   SSL   structure   (see
       CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3), SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)).

        ...
        typedef struct {
          int verbose_mode;
          int verify_depth;
          int always_continue;
        } mydata_t;
        int mydata_index;

        ...
        static int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
            char    buf[256];
            X509   *err_cert;
            int     err, depth;
            SSL    *ssl;
            mydata_t *mydata;

            err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
            err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
            depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);

            /*
             * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
             * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object.
             */
            ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
            mydata = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index);

            X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);

            /*
             * Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using
             * SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so
             * that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we
             * have violated the limit and want to log this error condition.
             * We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not
             * be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the
             * additional certificates would be logged.
             */
            if (depth > mydata->verify_depth) {
                preverify_ok = 0;
                err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
                X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
            }
            if (!preverify_ok) {
                printf("verify error:num=%d:%s:depth=%d:%s\n", err,
                       X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf);
            } else if (mydata->verbose_mode) {
                printf("depth=%d:%s\n", depth, buf);
            }

            /*
             * At this point, err contains the last verification error. We can use
             * it for something special
             */
            if (!preverify_ok && (err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT)) {
                X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
                printf("issuer= %s\n", buf);
            }

            if (mydata->always_continue)
                return 1;
            else
                return preverify_ok;
        }
        ...

        mydata_t mydata;

        ...
        mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "mydata index", NULL, NULL, NULL);

        ...
        SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
                           verify_callback);

        /*
         * Let the verify_callback catch the verify_depth error so that we get
         * an appropriate error in the logfile.
         */
        SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(verify_depth + 1);

        /*
         * Set up the SSL specific data into "mydata" and store it into th SSL
         * structure.
         */
        mydata.verify_depth = verify_depth; ...
        SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index, &mydata);

        ...
        SSL_accept(ssl);       /* check of success left out for clarity */
        if (peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) {
            if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK) {
                /* The client sent a certificate which verified OK */
            }
        }

SEE ALSO
       ssl(7),              SSL_new(3),             SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(3),
       SSL_get_verify_result(3),              SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3),
       SSL_get_peer_certificate(3),        SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3),
       SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3),    SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(3),
       CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)

HISTORY
       The        SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE        option,        and       the
       SSL_verify_client_post_handshake()   and   SSL_set_post_handshake_auth()
       functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.

COPYRIGHT
       Copyright 2000-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

       Licensed  under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
       this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a  copy
       in    the    file   LICENSE   in   the   source   distribution   or   at
       <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.

3.5.7                              2026-06-09          SSL_CTX_SET_VERIFY(3SSL)

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